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One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to 
adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are 
insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that 
one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible 
with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled 
out by the skeptical view per se face significant independent moral objections (Pereboom 2014: 
153). Despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to 
respond to criminal behavior—in particular incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alteration of 
relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for 
good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), 
taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model 
within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—
which I call the public health-quarantine model (Caruso 2016, 2017a)—provides a framework 
for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and 
preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal 
behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own since it prioritizes prevention and 
social justice.1  
 
In Section 1, I begin by (very) briefly summarizing my arguments against free will and basic 
desert moral responsibility. In Section 2, I then introduce and defend my public health-
quarantine model, which is a non-retributive alternative to criminal punishment that prioritizes 
prevention and social justice. In Sections 3 and 4, I take up and respond to two general 
objections to the public health-quarantine model. Since objections by Michael Corrado (2016), 
John Lemos (2016), Saul Smilanksy (2011, 2017), and Victor Tadros (2017) have been 
addressed in detail elsewhere (see Pereboom 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018), I will here 
focus on objections that have not yet been addressed. In particular, I will respond to concerns 
about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. I will argue that each of these concerns 
can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to 
retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts.  
 
1. Free Will Skepticism  
 
To begin, it is important to first get clear on what type of moral responsibility is being doubted or 
denied by free will skeptics. Most skeptics maintain that our best philosophical and scientific 
theories about the world indicate that what we do and the way we are is ultimately the result of 
factors beyond our control, whether that be determinism, chance, or luck, and that because of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This chapter includes some passages from Caruso (2016, 2017a).  
agents are never morally responsible in the sense needed to justify certain kinds of desert-based 
judgments, attitudes, or treatments—such as resentment, indignation, moral anger, backward-
looking blame, and retributive punishment. This is not to say that there are no other conceptions 
of responsibility that can be reconciled with determinism, chance, or luck. Nor is it to deny that 
there may be good reasons to maintain certain systems of punishment and reward. Rather, it is to 
insist that to hold people truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward, would be 
to hold them responsible for the results of the morally arbitrary or for what is ultimately beyond 
their control, which is fundamentally unfair and unjust.  
 
Derk Pereboom provides a very helpful definition of the kind of moral responsibility being 
doubted by skeptics, which he calls basic desert moral responsibility and defines as follows:  
 
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it to be hers in 
such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally 
wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally 
exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to 
be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an understanding 
of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or 
contractualist considerations. (2014: 2) 
 
Consistent with this definition, I have elsewhere argued that we should understand basic desert 
moral responsibility in terms of whether it would ever be appropriate for a hypothetical divine 
all-knowing judge (who didn’t necessarily create the agents in question) to administer differing 
kinds of treatment (i.e., greater or lesser rewards or punishments) to human agents on the basis of 
actions that these agents performed during their lifetime (see Caruso and Morris 2017). The 
purpose of invoking the notion of a divine judge in the afterlife is to instill the idea that any 
rewards or punishments issued after death will have no further utility—be it positive or negative. 
Any differences in treatment to agents (however slight) would therefore seem warranted only 
from a basic desert sense, and not a consequentialist perspective.  
 
In the past, the standard argument for free will skepticism was based on the notion of 
determinism—the thesis that every event or action, including human action, is the inevitable 
result of preceding events and actions and the laws of nature. Hard determinists argued that 
determinism is true and incompatible with free will and moral responsibility—either because it 
precludes the ability to do otherwise (leeway incompatibilism) or because it is inconsistent with 
one’s being the “ultimate source” of action (source incompatibilism). Hard determinism had its 
classic statement in the time when Newtonian physics reigned but it has very few defenders 
today. Most contemporary skeptics instead defend positions that are agnostic about 
determinism—e.g., Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014), Galen Strawson (1986, 1994), Saul Smilansky 
(2000), Neil Levy (2011), Richard Double (1991), Bruce Waller (2011, 2015), and myself 
(2012). Most maintain that while determinism is incompatible with free will and basic desert 
moral responsibility, so too is indeterminism, especially the variety posited by quantum 
mechanics. Others argue that regardless of the causal structure of the universe, we lack free will 
and moral responsibility because free will is incompatible with the pervasiveness of luck (levy 
2011). Others (still) argue that free will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent 
concepts, since to be free in the sense required for ultimate moral responsibility we would have 
to be causa sui (or “cause of oneself) and this is impossible (Strawson 1994).  
 
My own reasons for adopting free will skepticism amount to a rejection of both compatibilism 
and libertarianism. I maintain that the sort of free will required for basic desert moral 
responsibility is incompatible with causal determination by factors beyond the agent’s control 
and also with the kind of indeterminacy in action required by the most plausible versions of 
libertarianism. For this reason, I follow Pereboom in labeling my view hard incompatibilism 
(Pereboom 2001, 2014; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). Against the view that free will is 
compatible with the causal determination of our actions by natural factors beyond our control, I 
argue that there is no relevant difference between this prospect and our actions being causally 
determined by manipulators (see Pereboom 2001, 2014; Mele 2008; Todd 2011, 2013). I further 
argue that it is incompatible with an agent’s ability to do otherwise, a necessary condition for 
free will (Caruso 2012). Against event causal libertarianism, I advance the “luck” or 
“disappearing agent” objection, according to which agents are left unable to settle whether a 
decision/action occurs and hence cannot have the control in action required for moral 
responsibility (see Caruso 2012, 2015; Pereboom 2001, 2014; 2017b; Waller 1990, 2011; Levy 
2008, 2011; for non-skeptics who advance similar objections see Ekstrom 2000; Mele 1999, 
2017; Haji 2001). The same problem, I contend, arises for non-causal libertarian accounts since 
these too fail to provide agents with the control in action needed for basic desert (see Pereboom 
2014). While agent-causal libertarianism could, in theory, supply this sort of control, I argue that 
it cannot be reconciled with our best physical theories and faces additional problems accounting 
for mental causation (Caruso 2012). Since this exhausts the options for views on which we have 
the sort of free will at issue, I conclude that free will skepticism is the only remaining position.  
 
Since the arguments for hard incompatibilism have been spelled out and defended at great length 
elsewhere (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014; Caruso 2012, 2013; Levy 2011; Pereboom and 
Caruso 2018), and no solid refutation of them have yet been offered, I will not elaborate on them 
further here. Instead, my goal in this chapter is to explore the practical implications of free will 
skepticism. For many, it is not the philosophical arguments for free will skepticism that are the 
problem, it is the existential angst they create and the fear that relinquishing belief in free will 
and basic desert moral responsibility would undermine morality, negatively affect our 
interpersonal relationships, destroy meaning in life, and leave us unable to adequately deal with 
criminal behavior. Optimistic skeptics, however, respond by arguing that life without free will 
and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as these critics maintain, and, in 
fact, may be preferable in a number of important ways (see Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2014; Waller 
2011, 2015; Caruso 2016, 2017a, 2017b, forthcoming; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). These 
optimistic skeptics argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good 
interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened. They further maintain that 
morality and moral judgments would remain intact. And although retributivism and severe 
punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, they argue that the imposition of 
sanctions could serve purposes other than the punishment of the guilty—e.g., it can also be 
justified by its role in incapacitating, rehabilitating, and deterring offenders. In this chapter, I 
attempt to extend this general optimism about the practical implications of free will skepticism to 
the practices and policies surrounding criminal behavior.   
 
2. The Public Health-Quarantine Model 
 
It is important to begin by recognizing that retributive punishment is incompatible with free will 
skepticism because it maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that he 
deserves something bad to happen to him just because he has knowingly done wrong—this could 
include pain, deprivation, or death. As Douglas Husak puts it, “Punishment is justified only when 
and to the extent it is deserved” (2000: 82). And Mitchell Berman writes, “A person who 
unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or risks harm to others or to significant social interests 
deserves to suffer for that choice, and he deserves to suffer in proportion to the extent to which 
his regard or concern for others falls short of what is properly demanded of him” (2008: 269).
 
Furthermore, for the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action 
alone that provides the justification for punishment. The desert the retributivist invokes is basic 
in the sense that justifications for punishment that appeal to it are not reducible to 
consequentialist considerations nor to goods such as the safety of society or the moral 
improvement of the criminal.  
 
Free will skepticism undermines this justification for punishment because it does away with the 
idea of basic desert. If agents do not deserve blame just because they have knowingly done 
wrong, neither do they deserve punishment just because they have knowingly done wrong. The 
challenge facing free will skepticism, then, is to explain how we can adequately deal with 
criminal behavior without the justification provided by retributivism and basic desert moral 
responsibility. While some critics contend this cannot be done, free will skeptics point out that 
there are several alternative ways of justifying criminal punishment (and dealing with criminal 
behavior more generally) that do not appeal to the notion of basic desert and are thus not 
threatened by free will skepticism. These include moral education theories, deterrence theories, 
punishment justified by the right to harm in self-defense, and incapacitation theories. While I 
have elsewhere argued that the first two approaches face independent moral objections—
objections that, though perhaps not devastating, make them less desirable than their alternative 
(see Pereboom 2001, 2014; Caruso 2016; Pereboom and Caruso 2018)—I maintain that an 
incapacitation account built on the right to harm in self-defense provides the best option for 
justifying a policy for treatment of criminals consistent with free will skepticism (Caruso 2016, 
2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). 
 
The public health-quarantine model is based on an analogy with quarantine and draws on a 
comparison between treatment of dangerous criminals and treatment of carriers of dangerous 
diseases. It takes as its starting point Derk Pereboom’s famous account (2001, 2013, 2014). In its 
simplest form, it can be stated as follows: (1) Free will skepticism maintains that criminals are 
not morally responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense; (2) plainly, many carriers of 
dangerous diseases are not responsible in this or in any other sense for having contracted these 
diseases; (3) yet, we generally agree that it is sometimes permissible to quarantine them, and the 
justification for doing so is the right to self-protection and the prevention of harm to others; (4) 
for similar reasons, even if a dangerous criminal is not morally responsible for his crimes in the 
basic desert sense (perhaps because no one is ever in this way morally responsible) it could be as 
legitimate to preventatively detain him as to quarantine the non-responsible carrier of a serious 
communicable disease (Pereboom 2014: 156). 
 
The first thing to note about the theory is that although one might justify quarantine (in the case 
of disease) and incapacitation (in the case of dangerous criminals) on purely utilitarian or 
consequentialist grounds, both Pereboom and I want to resist this strategy (see Pereboom and 
Caruso 2018). Instead, on our view incapacitation of the dangerous is justified on the ground of 
the right to harm in self defense and defense of others. That we have this right has broad appeal, 
much broader than utilitarianism or consequentialism has. In addition, this makes the view more 
resilient to a number of objections (see Pereboom 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018).  
 
Second, the quarantine model places several constraints on the treatment of criminals (see 
Pereboom 2001, 2014; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). First, as less dangerous diseases justify only 
preventative measures less restrictive than quarantine, so less dangerous criminal tendencies 
justify only more moderate restraints (Pereboom 2014: 156). In fact, for certain minor crimes 
perhaps only some degree of monitoring could be defended. Secondly, the incapacitation account 
that results from this analogy demands a degree of concern for the rehabilitation and well-being 
of the criminal that would alter much of current practice. Just as fairness recommends that we 
seek to cure the diseased we quarantine, so fairness would counsel that we attempt to rehabilitate 
the criminals we detain (Pereboom 2014: 156). If a criminal cannot be rehabilitated, however, 
and our safety requires his indefinite confinement, this account provides no justification for 
making his life more miserable than would be required to guard against the danger he poses 
(Pereboom 2014: 156).  
 
Third, this account also provides a more resilient proposal for justifying criminal sanctions than 
other non-retributive options. One advantage it has, say, over consequentialist deterrence theories 
is that it has more restrictions placed on it with regard to using people merely as a means. For 
instance, as it is illegitimate to treat carriers of a disease more harmfully than is necessary to 
neutralize the danger they pose, treating those with violent criminal tendencies more harshly than 
is required to protect society will be illegitimate as well. In fact, in all our writings on the 
subject, Pereboom and I have always maintained the principle of least infringement, which holds 
that the least restrictive measures should be taken to protect public health and safety (Caruso 
2016, 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). This ensures that criminal sanctions will be 
proportionate to the danger posed by an individual, and any sanctions that exceed this upper 
bound will be unjustified.  
 
In addition to these restrictions on harsh and unnecessary treatment, the model also advocates for 
a broader approach to criminal behavior that moves beyond the narrow focus on sanctions. On 
the model I have developed, the quarantine analogy is placed within the broader justificatory 
framework of public health ethics (Caruso 2016, 2017a). Public health ethics not only justifies 
quarantining carriers of infectious diseases on the grounds that it is necessary to protect public 
health, it also requires that we take active steps to prevent such outbreaks from occurring in the 
first place. Quarantine is only needed when the public health system fails in its primary function. 
Since no system is perfect, quarantine will likely be needed for the foreseeable future, but it 
should not be the primary means of dealing with public health. The analogous claim holds for 
incapacitation. Taking a public health approach to criminal behavior would allow us to justify 
the incapacitation of dangerous criminals when needed, but it would also make prevention a 
primary function of the criminal justice system. So instead of myopically focusing on 
punishment, the public health-quarantine model shifts the focus to identifying and addressing the 
systemic causes of crime, such as poverty, low social economic status, systematic disadvantage, 
mental illness, homelessness, educational inequity, abuse, and addiction (see Caruso 2017a).  
 
In my recent Public Health and Safety: The Social Determinants of Health and Criminal 
Behavior (2017a), I argue that the social determinants of health (SDH) and the social 
determinants of criminal behavior (SDCB) are broadly similar, and that we should adopt a broad 
public health approach for identifying and taking action on these shared social determinants. I 
focus on how social inequities and systemic injustices affect health outcomes and criminal 
behavior, how poverty affects brain development, how offenders often have pre-existing medical 
conditions (especially mental health issues), how homelessness and education affects health and 
safety outcomes, how environmental health is important to both public health and safety, how 
involvement in the criminal justice system itself can lead to or worsen health and cognitive 
problems, and how a public health approach can be successfully applied within the criminal 
justice system. I argue that, just as it is important to identify and take action on the SDH if we 
want to improve health outcomes, it is equally important to identify and address the SDCB. And 
I conclude by offering eight broad public policy proposals for implementing a public health 
approach aimed at addressing the SDH and SDCB (see Caruso 2017a for details).     
 
Furthermore, the public health framework I adopt sees social justice as a foundational 
cornerstone to public health and safety (Caruso 2016, 2017a). In public health ethics, a failure on 
the part of public health institutions to ensure the social conditions necessary to achieve a 
sufficient level of health is considered a grave injustice. An important task of public health 
ethics, then, is to identify which inequalities in health are the most egregious and thus which 
should be given the highest priority in public health policy and practice. The public health 
approach to criminal behavior likewise maintains that a core moral function of the criminal 
justice system is to identify and remedy social and economic inequalities responsible for crime. 
Just as public health is negatively affected by poverty, racism, and systematic inequality, so too 
is public safety. This broader approach to criminal justice therefore places issues of social justice 
at the forefront. It sees racism, sexism, poverty, and systemic disadvantage as serious threats to 
public safety and it prioritizes the reduction of such inequalities (see Caruso 2017a).  
 
While there are different ways of understanding social justice and different philosophical 
accounts of what a theory of justice aims to achieve, I favor a capability approach according to 
which the development of capabilities—what each individual is able to do or be—is essential to 
human well-being (e.g., Sen 1985, 1999; Nussbaum 2011; Power and Faden 2006). For 
capability theorists, human well-being is the proper end of a theory of justice. And on the 
particular capability approach I favor, social justice is grounded in six key features of human 
well-being: health, reasoning, self-determination, attachment, personal security, and respect (see 
Powers and Faden 2006; Caruso 2017a).2 Following Powers and Faden (2006), I maintain that 
each of these six dimensions is an essential feature of well-being such that “a life substantially 
lacking in any one is a life seriously deficient in what it is reasonable for anyone to want, 
whatever else they want” (Powers and Faden 2006: 8). The job of justice is therefore to achieve a 
sufficiency of these six essential dimensions of human well-being, since each is a separate 
indicator of a decent life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note that this is a pared down list from the ones offered by Martha Nussbaum and other capability theorists (see 
Nussbaum 2011). 
 
The key idea of capability approaches is that social arrangements should aim to expand people’s 
capabilities—their freedom to promote or achieve functionings that are important to them. 
Functionings are defined as the valuable activities and states that make up human well-being, 
such as having a healthy body, being safe, or having a job. While they are related to goods and 
income, they are instead described in terms of what a person is able to do or be as a result. For 
example, when a person’s need for food (a commodity) is met, they enjoy the functioning of 
being well-nourished. Examples of functionings include being mobile, being healthy, being 
adequately nourished, and being educated. The genuine opportunity to achieve a particular 
functioning is called a capability. Capabilities are “the alternative combination of functionings 
that are feasible for [a person] to achieve”—they are “the substantive freedom” a person has “to 
lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value” (Sen 1999: 87).  
 
As Tabandeh, Gardoni, and Murphy describe:  
 
Genuine opportunities and actual achievements are influenced by what individuals have 
and what they can do with what they have. What they can do with what they have is a 
function of the structure of social, legal, economic, and political institutions and of the 
characteristics of the built-environment (i.e., infrastructure). For example, consider the 
functioning of being mobile. The number of times an individual travels per week can be 
an indicator of mobility achievement. When explaining a given individual’s achievement 
or lack of achievement, a capability approach takes into consideration the conditions that 
must be in place for an individual to be mobile. For instance, the possession of certain 
resources, like a bike, may influence mobility. However, possessing a bike may not be 
sufficient to guarantee mobility. If the individual has physical disabilities, then the bike 
will be of no help to travel. Similarly, if there are no paved roads or if societal culture 
imposes a norm that women are not allowed to ride a bike, then it will become difficult or 
even impossible to travel by means of a bike. As this example makes clear, different 
factors will influence the number of times the individual travels. (Tabandeh, Gardoni, and 
Murphy 2017) 
 
Thinking in terms of capabilities raises a wider range of issues than simply looking at the amount 
of resources or commodities people have, because people have different needs. In the example 
given above, just providing bicycles to people will not be enough to increase the functioning of 
being mobile if you are disabled or prohibited from riding because of sexist social norms. A 
capabilities approach to social justice therefore requires that we consider and address a larger set 
of social issues.    
  
Bringing everything together, my public health-quarantine model characterizes the moral 
foundation of public health as social justice, not just the advancement of good health outcomes. 
That is, while promoting social goods (like health) is one area of concern, public health ethics as 
I conceive it is embedded within a broader commitment to secure a sufficient level of health and 
safety for all and to narrow unjust inequalities (see Powers and Faden 2006). More specifically, I 
see the capability approach to social justice as the proper moral foundation of public health 
ethics. This means that the broader commitment of public health should be the achievement of 
those capabilities needed to secure a sufficient level of human well-being—including, but not 
limited to, health, reasoning, self-determination, attachment, personal security, and respect. By 
placing social justice at the foundation of the public health approach, the realms of criminal 
justice and social justice are brought closer together. I see this as a virtue of the theory since it is 
hard to see how we can adequately deal with criminal justice without simultaneously addressing 
issues of social justice. Retributivists tend to disagree since they approach criminal justice as an 
issue of individual responsibility and desert, not as an issue of prevention and public safety. I 
believe it is a mistake to hold that the criteria of individual accountability can be settled apart 
from considerations of social justice and the social determinants of criminal behavior. Making 
social justice foundational, as my public health-quarantine model does, places on us a collective 
responsibility—which is forward-looking and perfectly consistent with free will skepticism—to 
redress unjust inequalities and to advance collective aims and priorities such as public health and 
safety. The capability approach and the public health approach therefore fit nicely together. Both 
maintain that poor health and safety are often the byproducts of social inequities, and both 
attempt to identify and address these social inequities in order to achieve a sufficient level of 
health and safety. 
 
Summarizing the public health-quarantine model, then, the core idea is that the right to harm in 
self-defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the 
minimum harm required for adequate protection. The resulting account would not justify the sort 
of criminal punishment whose legitimacy is most dubious, such as death or confinement in the 
most common kinds of prisons in our society. The model also specifies attention to the well-
being of criminals, which would change much of current policy. Furthermore, the public health 
component of the theory prioritizes prevention and social justice and aims at identifying and 
taking action on the social determinants of health and criminal behavior. This combined 
approach to dealing with criminal behavior, I maintain, is sufficient for dealing with dangerous 
criminals, leads to a more humane and effective social policy, and is actually preferable to the 
harsh and often excessive forms of punishment that typically come with retributivism.  
 
3. Proportionality and Human Dignity 
 
One concern critics have with my approach to criminal behavior is that they fear it will not 
protect human dignity and respect for persons in the same way that retributivism does. 
Retributivists adopt something called the principle of proportionality. As Alec Walen describes: 
“Retributive justice holds that it would be bad to punish a wrongdoer more than she deserves, 
where what she deserves must be in some way proportional to the gravity of her crime. Inflicting 
disproportionate punishment wrongs her just as, even if not quite as much as, punishing an 
innocent person wrongs her…” (Walen 2014). For retributivists, the principle of proportionality 
is needed to guarantee respect for persons since it treats them as autonomous, morally 
responsible agents and not just objects to be “fixed” or used as a means to an end. Hence, 
punishment administered because one is a morally responsible autonomous person who justly 
deserves punishment due to his or her own choices, preserves one’s status as a person and a 
member of the human community of responsible agents as long as it is not disproportionate (see 
Lewis 1971; Oldenquist 1988; and Morris 1968). Critics contend that without this principle in 
place, there will be no limit to the harshness of punishment meted out and no way to block 
treating individuals as a mere means to an end.  
 
Immanuel Kant, for example, famously argued that human beings possess a special dignity and 
worth which demands that they be treated as ends in themselves and never as mere means.  
According to Kant, imprisonment could only be justified on the grounds that the criminal 
conduct was a product of the free willed choices of the criminal making him/her deserving of a 
punitive response. Kant, however, also believed that the death penalty was deserved, in fact 
obligatory, in cases of murder:  
 
But whoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical 
substitute or surrogate that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice. There is 
no likeness or proportion between life, however painful, and death; and therefore there is 
no equality between the crime of murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially 
accomplished by the execution of the criminal. His death, however, must be kept free 
from all maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his person loathsome or 
abominable. Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its 
members—as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to 
separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world—the last murderer lying in 
prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done 
in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may 
not remain upon the people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as participators in 
the murder as a public violation of justice. (Kant 1790, Part II: 6) 
 
While many retributivists disagree with Kant regarding the death penalty, they share his belief 
that punishment should not exceed what is deserved and that free will and basic desert moral 
responsibility are needed to maintain respect for persons. John Lemos, for example, has argued, 
“the human capacity for moral responsibility gives human beings a special dignity and worth that 
is fundamental to a proper system of morality grounded on the concept of respect for persons” 
(2013: 78), and theories of punishment that reject basic desert moral responsibility are incapable 
of protecting this special dignity and worth (see Lemos 2013, 2016).  
 
In response, I would argue three things: (1) it is unclear that the principle of proportionality in 
actual practice protects respect for persons any better than the alternatives; (2) what counts as 
proportional punishment is unclear and as a result several important questions remain—e.g., how 
should we measure the gravity of a wrong, and how can punishment be “proportional” to it?; and 
(3) the public health-quarantine model has a non-desert-based principle of proportionality of its 
own—one which I maintain is capable of securing respect for persons and protecting innocent 
people from being used as a means to an end. Let me take each of these in turn.  
 
First, while concerns over proportionality are important ones, the worry that relinquishing the 
concept of just deserts will lead to harsh and inhumane treatment of persons is overblown. 
Before getting to the more philosophical responses to this objection, I would first like to examine 
the question empirically and ask whether belief in just deserts and retributive justice ensure 
punishment is proportional any better than the alternatives. Since the real-life effects of free will 
skepticism is what is being questioned here, I think the empirical question is an important one. If 
the critics are wrong about the protective power of desert-based moral responsibility and the 
constraints it places on proportional punishment, then this concern loses much of its force.  
 
Empirically speaking, then, does belief in just deserts and retributive justice ensure punishment 
is proportional? I contend that it does not. Of course, there are many reasonable retributivists 
who acknowledge that we imprison far too many people, in far too harsh conditions, but the 
problem is that retributivism remains committed to the core belief that criminals deserve to be 
punished and suffer for the harms they have caused. Recall Kant’s claim that we should execute 
the last prisoner on the island before we abandon it in order that everyone “realize the desert of 
his deeds.” This retributive impulse in actual practice—despite theoretical appeals to 
proportionality by its proponents—often leads to practices and policies that try to make life in 
prison as unpleasant as possible.  
      
Bruce Waller has done an excellent job examining this question empirically and he sets up the 
cultural expectations as follows:     
 
Belief in individual moral responsibility is deep and broad in both the United States and 
England; in fact, the belief seems to be more deeply entrenched in those cultures than 
anywhere else—certainly deeper there than in Europe. That powerful belief in moral 
responsibility is not an isolated belief, existing independently of other cultural factors; 
rather, it is held in place—and in turn, helps anchor—a neo-liberal cultural system of 
beliefs and values. At the opposite end of the scale are social democratic corporatist 
cultures like Sweden that have taken significant steps beyond the narrow focus on 
individual moral responsibility. With that picture in view, consider the basic protections 
which philosophers have claimed that the moral responsibility system afford: first, 
protection against extreme punitive measures; second, protection of the dignity and rights 
of those who are held morally responsible and subject to punishment; and third, a special 
protection of the innocent against unjust punishment. According to the claim that strong 
belief in individual moral responsibility protects against abuses, we would expect the 
United States and Great Britain (the neo-liberal cultures with the strongest commitment 
to individual moral responsibility) to score best in providing such protections; and we 
would predict that Norway, Sweden, and Denmark (the social democratic corporatist 
cultures, with much more qualified belief in individual moral responsibility) would be the 
worst abusers. (2014: 6; see also 2015) 
 
What happens when we actually make the comparison, however, is that we find the exact 
opposite. That is, we find that the stronger the belief in basic desert moral responsibility (as in 
the United States) the harsher the punishment, the greater the skepticism of moral responsibility 
(as in Norway) the weaker the inclination toward punishment. A few cross-cultural statistics 
should help make this point salient.  
 
In 2014, the Pew Research Center asked people whether they agreed or disagreed with the notion 
that personal success is determined by factors outside of oneself. While not exactly measuring 
belief in free will and moral responsibility, the survey was able to confirm that Americans are 
much more likely to see success or failure in personal terms. This is in line with the systems of 
thinking Waller describes and is unsurprising given the U.S. emphasis on rugged individualism 
and individual responsibility—which, of course, is closely aligned with attitudes about just 
deserts, praise and blame, punishment and reward. For example, 57% of Americans disagreed 
with the statement “Success in life is determined by forces outside our control,” which was the 
highest percentage among advanced countries. The U.K. was immediately behind the U.S. with 
55% disagreeing. Unfortunately Scandinavian countries were not included in the survey but 
European nations Germany and Italy came in at 31% and 32% respectively.  
 
Now, retributivists would have us believe that given its strong commitment to individual moral 
responsibility, the United States can be expected to provide better protections against harsh and 
excessively punitive forms of punishment than countries with a weaker commitment to 
individual moral responsibility. The reality, however, is quite the opposite. Consider the problem 
of mass incarceration in the United States. While the United States makes up only 5% of the 
world’s population, it houses 25% of the world’s prisoners—that’s one of the highest rates of 
incarceration known to mankind. Despite a steady decline in the crime rate over the past two 
decades, the Unites States imprisons more than 700 prisoners for every 100,000 of population, 
according to the International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS).3 Compare that to the social 
democratic countries with a much weaker commitment to individual moral responsibility, such 
as Norway, Sweden, and Finland, where the imprisonment rate hovers around 70 per 100,000. 
As a proportion of the population, then, the United States has 10 times as many prisoners as 
these other countries. Furthermore, the U.S. not only imprisons at a much higher rate, it also 
imprisons in notoriously harsh conditions.  
 
American supermax prisons are often cruel places, using a number of harsh forms of punishment 
including extended solitary confinement. Prisoners are isolated in windowless, soundproof 
cubicles for 23 to 24 hours each day, sometimes for decades. Under such conditions, prisoners 
experience severe suffering, often resulting in serious psychological problems. Supreme court 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, for instance, recently stated that, “solitary confinement literally drives 
men mad.”4 Looked at empirically, then, it’s nigh impossible to defend the claim that 
commitment to just deserts and retributivism ensures proportional and humane punishment. In 
fact, the opposite seems to be the case—the problem of disproportionate punishment seems to 
grow more out of a desire for retribution and the belief that people justly deserve what they get 
than from free will skepticism. This claim is further supported by the fact that individual states 
within the United States with stronger belief in individual moral responsibility tend to have 
harsher forms of punishment (see Waller 2014, 2015). Given these cross-cultural and inter-state 
comparisons, I cannot help but conclude along with Waller that, “commitment to moral 
responsibility exacerbates rather than prevents excessively harsh punitive policies” (2014: 7). 
 
Recent work in experimental philosophy further revels that where belief in free will is strongest 
we tend to find increased punitiveness (see Shariff et al. 2014; Carey and Paulhus 2013). Perhaps 
the strongest evidence for this linking comes from a set of recent studies by Shariff et al. (2014). 
Shariff and his colleagues hypothesized that if free will beliefs support attributions of moral 
responsibility, then reducing these beliefs should make people less punitive in their attitudes 
about punishment. In a series of four studies they tested this prediction. In Study 1 they found 
that people with weaker free will beliefs endorsed less retributive attitudes regarding punishment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 International Centre for Prison Studies, “World Prison Brief,” accessed November 5, 2013, www.prisonstud-
ies.org/highest-lowest.  	  
4 He made this statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and Federal 
Government, as reported on in the Huffington Post on 3/24/2015: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/24/anthony-kennedy-solitary-confinement_n_6934550.html 
of criminals, yet their consequentialist attitudes were unaffected. In the study, two hundred and 
forty-four American participants completed the seven-item Free Will subscale of the Free Will 
and Determinism Plus scale (FAD+) (Paulhus and Carey 2011), which measures belief in free 
will. In order to further measure attitudes toward retributivist and consequentialist motivations 
for punishment, Shariff and his colleagues had participants read descriptions of retributivism and 
consequentialism as motivations for punishment and then indicate on two separate Likert scales 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) how important retributivism and consequentialism 
should be in determining motivation for criminal punishments. As predicted, Shariff et al. found 
that stronger belief in free will predicted greater support for retributive punishment, but was not 
predictive of support for consequentialist punishment. The effects remained significant when 
statistically controlled for age, gender, education, religiosity, and economic and social political 
ideology. Study 1 therefore supports the hypothesis that free will beliefs positively predict 
retributive attitudes, yet it also suggests that “the motivation to punish in order to benefit society 
(consequentialist punishment) may remain intact, even while the need for blame and desire for 
retribution are forgone” (Shariff et al. 2014: 7).  
 
It is Study 2, however, that really highlights how stronger belief in free will and moral 
responsibility can lead to increased punitiveness. In the study, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two groups. In the anti-free will condition, participants were given a passage 
from Francis Crick’s (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis which rejected free will and advocated 
for a mechanistic view of human behavior. In the neutral condition, the passage was unrelated to 
free will. Next, participants read a fictional vignette involving an offender who beat a man to 
death. Acting as hypothetic jurors, participants recommended the length of the prison sentence 
(if any) that this offender should serve following a 2-year, nearly 100%-effective, rehabilitation 
treatment. As Shariff et al. describe: 
 
The notion that the offender had been rehabilitated was used in order to isolate 
participants’ desire for punishment as retribution. The passage further focused 
participants on retributive, rather than consequentialist, punishment by noting that the 
prosecution and defense had agreed that the rehabilitation would prevent recidivism and 
that any further detention after rehabilitation would offer no additional deterrence of 
other potential criminals. (Shariff et al. 2014: 4) 
 
As predicted, participants who read the anti-free passage recommended significantly lighter 
prison sentences than participants who read the neutral passage. In particular, participants whose 
free-will beliefs had been experimentally diminished recommended roughly half the length of 
imprisonment (~5 years) compared with participants who read the neutral passage (~10 years). 
This study helps further confirm that it is actually commitment to retributivism that increases 
punitiveness, contrary to what its proponent’s claim.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Carey and Paulhus (2013) also found a relationship between beliefs about free will and punishment. In particular, 
they found that believing more strongly in free will was correlated with increased punitiveness—i.e., free will 
believers were more likely to call for harsher criminal punishment in a number of hypothetical scenarios. In the third 
of their studies, for instance, Carey and Paulhus presented two scenarios portraying serious crimes (child 
molestation and the rape of an adult woman) and tested the degree to which subjects’ attitudes towards punishment 
of the criminals would be impacted by factors including the criminal having been abused as a child and assurance 
that a medical procedure would prevent the criminal from ever perpetrating similar crimes again. The fact that 
subjects who expressed the strongest belief in free will were essentially the only group of subjects whose attitudes 
 
Moving on to my second reply, the principle of proportionality does not provide us with any 
clear and unambiguous way of measuring the gravity of a wrong. Nor does it tell us how we 
should determine which punishment is “proportional” to the wrong done. There is no magic 
ledger we can look to that spells out the gravity of a wrong in one column and the punishment 
that is deserved in another. This is obvious from the fact that retributivists often disagree with 
one another about how to measure the gravity of a wrong—consider, for instance, H.L.A. Hart’s 
question: “Is negligently causing the destruction of a city worse than the intentional wounding of 
a single policeman?” (1968: 162). And even when there is wide agreement on the gravity of a 
wrong, there is still often disagreement about what kind of punishment is deserved. For instance, 
all retributivists can agree that murdering an innocent person is a grievous wrong, but they can, 
and often do, disagree on what count as “proportional” punishment. Kant proposes death. Others 
propose life in prison. Others still think life in prison is too harsh. How do we decide questions 
like these on the principle of proportionality? 
 
The problem of measuring gravity, for instance, is an important one for retributivists since what 
punishment is deserved is going to be determined by this. Yet the proportionality principle leaves 
unanswered several important questions. The first is “does it matter if harm is caused, or is the 
gravity of the wrong set fully by the wrong risked or intended” (Walen 2014). (For the position 
that harm does not matter, see Feinberg 1995; Alexander, Ferzan, and Morse 2009; for a 
criticism of that view, see Levy 2005; Walen 2010.) Second, what significance, if any, should be 
given to the difference between being punished for the first time, and having been punished 
before and then having committed the same or a similar wrong again (see Walen 2014)? Until 
retributivists can agree on how to resolve these problems it remains unclear how gravity should 
be measured, which needs to be settled if we are to know how to apply the proportionality 
principle in practice. 
 
Assuming for the moment, however, that a rank order of gravity is possible, there still remains 
the problem of determining what counts as proportional punishment. There are two basic senses 
of proportionality that can be found in the literature: cardinal and ordinal. Cardinal 
proportionality sets absolute measures for punishment that is proportional to a given crime; 
ordinal proportionality requires only that more serious crimes should be punished more severely 
(Walen 2014). There are, however, problems with both approaches. Cardinal proportionality, for 
instance, tends to lead to unacceptable extremes. For example:  
 
Lex Talionis…offers a theory of cardinal proportionality. In its traditional form—an eye 
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth—it seems implausible, both for being too lenient in some 
cases (take $10 from a thief who stole $10), and too extreme in others (repeatedly torture 
and rape someone who had committed many such acts himself). Kant proposed what 
might be thought a better version, saying that the thief should lose not just the value of 
what he stole, but instead all rights to property (1797: 142), and prohibiting those forms 
of “mistreatment that could make the humanity in the person suffering it into something 
abominable” (ibid.). Nonetheless, his measure for theft swings to the overly punitive side, 
leaving the convicted thief a dependent on the state, and thereby “reduced to the status of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
towards punishment were not mitigated by environmental or consequentialist considerations led the researchers to 
conclude that “free will belief is related to retributivist punishment” (2013: 138).   
a slave for a certain time, or permanently if the state sees fit” (ibid.). Others have tried to 
rehabilitate lex talionis, arguing, for example, that it can be rendered plausible if 
interpreted to call for punishment that “possess[es] some or all of the characteristics that 
made the offense wrong” (Waldron 1992: 35). But however one spells out the wrong-
making characteristics, it seems likely that lex talionis will provide a measure either too 
vague to be of much help (see Shafer-Landau 1996: 299–302; 2000: 197–198), or too 
specific to be plausible (at least in some cases). (Walen 2014) 
 
Ordinal proportionality, on the other hand, faces a different problem: 
 
If all that were required to do justice is to rank order wrongs by their gravity and then 
provide a mapping onto a range of punishments that likewise went from lighter to more 
serious—respecting the norms of rank-ordering and parity—then neither the range of 
punishments from a fine of $1 up to a fine of $100, nor from 40 years to 60 years in 
prison, would provide disproportionate punishment, no matter what the crimes. This 
seems wrong. Murder should not be punished with a $100 fine, and littering should not 
be punished with 40 years in prison. Some vague degree of cardinality therefore seems to 
be called for, punishing grave wrongs with heavy penalties and minor wrongs with light 
penalties. (Walen 2014) 
 
Such problems reveal that the principle of proportionality is too ambiguous to guarantee respect 
for persons since it is unable to draw a clear line in the sand between deserved punishments on 
the one hand and cruel and inhumane punishment on the other. As a result, cultural and societal 
pressure can easily affect how gravity and proportional punishment are measured, and this can 
easily lead (as highlighted above) to excessively punitive forms of punishment. 
 
Lastly, while rejecting the retributivist principle of proportionality, the public health-quarantine 
model has a proportionality principle of its own. It maintains that criminal sanctions should be 
proportionate to the danger posed by an individual, and any sanctions that exceed this upper 
bound will be unjustified. This is coupled with the principle of least infringement, which holds 
that the least restrictive measures should be taken to protect public health and safety. Together 
these two principles set strict limits on how individuals can and should be treated. Consider again 
the hypothetical scenario used in the Shariff et al. study. The fictional case involved an offender 
who beat a man to death but after serving two years in prison was nearly 100% effectively 
rehabilitated. The case further stipulated that “the prosecution and defense had agreed that the 
rehabilitation would prevent recidivism and that any further detention after rehabilitation would 
offer no additional deterrence of other potential criminals” (Shariff et al. 2014: 4). On my model, 
it would be unjust to continue to incapacitate this individual. Retributivists, on the other hand, 
will generally feel that this person deserves to be punished further since two years in prison is 
not proportional punishment—although, as my comments on the proportionality principle above 
indicate, they will likely disagree on exactly what this additional punishment should amount to.  
 
Which of these views better respects human dignity? I have a hard time seeing how punishing 
someone who is no longer a threat to society, and in a way that exceeds effectiveness, respects 
human dignity. Instead, I maintain that the public health-quarantine model actually respects 
human dignity more since it specifies that (a) individuals who are not a serious threat to society 
should not be incapacitated, (b) no one should be incapacitated longer than is absolutely 
necessary (where this is determined by the continued threat the individual poses to society), and 
(c) when it is necessary to incapacitate an individual, we must do so in a way that treats them 
humanely, with respect and dignity, and with rehabilitation as our goal. There is more to human 
dignity than the retributivist obsession with giving individuals their just deserts. Human dignity 
also demands that we not dehumanize, disenfranchise, and treat cruelly those we imprison. The 
public health-quarantine model, I contend, does a batter job as respecting human dignity since it 
prioritizes prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration, and demands a level of concern for the 
well-being of prisoners. 
 
Furthermore, the public health-quarantine model can also respect human dignity by prohibiting 
the incapacitation of innocent people (see Pereboom and Caruso 2018). Neither Pereboom nor I 
set out our position in a strict consequentialist theoretical context. Rather, we justify 
incapacitation on the ground of the right to self-defense and defense of others. That right does 
not extend to people who are non-threats. It would therefore be wrong to incapacitate someone 
who is innocent since they are not a serious threat to society. The aim of protection is justified by 
a right with clear bounds, and not by a consequentialist theory on which the bounds are unclear 
(see Pereboom and Caruso 2018). For this reason, the public health-quarantine model provides a 
distinct advantage over consequentialist deterrence theories since it has more restrictions placed 
on it with regard to using people merely as a means. Concerns over the “use” objection, for 
example, count more heavily against punishment policy justified simply on consequentialist 
grounds than they do against incapacitation based on the quarantine analogy (see also Pereboom 
2014, 2017a). 
 
4. Victims’ Rights 
 
A second objection is that victims of violent crime will never receive proper justice or 
satisfaction on my account since it rejects harsh punishment in favor of rehabilitating dangerous 
criminals and implementing the least restrictive forms of sanctions needed to secure public 
safety. Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein and Republican Senator Jon Kyl have argued, for 
instance, that “for too long, our court system has tilted in favor of accused criminals and has 
proven appallingly indifferent to the suffering of crime victims.”6 I think this is a gross 
misrepresentation of the U.S. criminal justice system over the last few decades—evidenced by 
our current mass incarceration crisis, the heavy-handedness of mandatory minimums, the 
increased use of plea bargains, and the three-strikes-you-are-out laws that have swept the 
nation—but I mention it because it captures a common concern critics have with reformist 
proposals like my own. The concern is that such models put the rights of criminals above the 
concerns of victims, and worse still advocate for reforms that run contrary to the concerns of 
victims. While I take this objection seriously, I do not think the public health-quarantine model is 
“indifferent to the suffering of crime victims.” Rather, I maintain that it better reflects the 
attitudes and preferences of most victims and does a better job preventing future victims.  
 
First, I contend that this objection is predicated on a mistaken assumption. The underlying 
assumption seems to be that most victims of violent crime want revenge and retribution above all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As reported on in the Washington Post (2016): https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/05/even-
violent-crime-victims-say-our-prisons-are-making-crime-worse 
else and that to deny them the satisfaction of seeing their perpetrators suffer is an injustice. 
Proponents of the death penalty and other forms of excessively punitive forms of punishment 
typically argue, for instance, that whatever deterrence factor such punishment may or may not 
have, such punishment provides justice for the victims and their families since it satisfies their 
desire for revenge and proportional punishment. Kant, for example, famously argued that if a 
people do not insist on the execution of murders, “blood guilt” would “cling” to them “as 
collaborators in this public violation of justice” (1797: 142). Setting aside the issue of what 
counts as proportional punishment raised above, it is an empirical question what victims actually 
want, what their preferences and attitudes are, and what kind of justice they would like to see 
from the criminal justice system.  
 
Fortunately, the Alliance for Safety and Justice has recently investigated exactly these questions. 
In its first-of-its-kind national survey, they found that victims of violent crime say they want to 
see shorter prison sentences, less spending on prisons, and a greater focus on the rehabilitation 
of criminals (2016). The survey polled the attitudes and beliefs of more than 800 crime victims 
pooled from a nationally representative sample of over 3,000 respondents. According to the 
report:  
 
Perhaps to the surprise of some, victims overwhelmingly prefer criminal justice 
approaches that prioritize rehabilitation over punishment and strongly prefer investments 
in crime prevention and treatment to more spending on prisons and jails. These views are 
not always accurately reflected in the media or in state capitols and should be considered 
in policy debates. (2016: 4) 
 
An examination of the data reveals that victims prefer an approach much closer to the public 
health-quarantine model, with its focus on prevention, social justice, and rehabilitation, than 
retributivism. For instance, the survey found that: 
 
• By a 2 to 1 margin, victims prefer that the criminal justice system focus more on 
rehabilitating people who commit crimes than punishing them.  
• By a margin of 15 to 1, victims prefer increased investments in schools and education 
over more investments in prisons and jails.  
• By a margin of 10 to 1, victims prefer increased investments in job creation over more 
investments in prisons and jails.  
• By a margin of 7 to 1, victims prefer increased investments in mental health treatment 
over investments in prisons and jails.  
• By a margin of nearly 3 to 1, victims believe prison makes people more likely to commit 
crimes than to rehabilitate them.  
• By a margin of 7 to 1, victims prefer increased investments in crime prevention and 
programs for at-risk youth over more investments in prisons and jails.  
• 6 in 10 victims prefer shorter prison sentences and more spending on prevention and 
rehabilitation to prison sentences that keep people incarcerated for as long as possible.  
• By a margin of 4 to 1, victims prefer increased investments in drug treatment over more 
investment in prisons and jails.  
• By a margin of 2 to 1, victims prefer increased investments in community supervision, 
such as probation and parole, over more investments in prisons and jails.  
• 7 in 10 victims prefer that prosecutors focus on solving neighborhood problems and 
stopping repeat crime through rehabilitation, even if it means fewer convictions and 
prison sentences.  
• 6 in 10 victims prefer that prosecutors consider victims’ opinions on what would help 
them recover from the crime, even when victims do not want long prison sentences.  
 
The report also found that victims’ views remained consistent across demographics—that is, for 
each of the questions above, they found majority or plurality support across demographic groups, 
including age, gender, race, ethnicity, and political party affiliation. This skepticism of prisons is 
in line with most social science research, which has generally shown that mass incarceration 
causes more crime than it prevents, that institutionalizing young offenders makes them more 
likely to commit crime as adults, and that spending time in prison teaches people how to be 
better criminals (see, e.g., Weatherburn 2010).   
 
It would seem, then, that those tough-on-crime proponents who invoke the names of victims of 
violent crime and claim to speak for them, such as Feinstein and Kyl, often misrepresent their 
actual preferences, attitudes, and desires. To say that approaches like the public health-
quarantine model are “appallingly indifferent to the suffering of crime victims” is to discount 
what victims say they actually want. It also overlooks the fact that the best way to reduce crime 
and the suffering caused by it is to (a) prevent the crime from occurring in the first place by 
addressing the causal determinates of crime, and (b) to rehabilitate criminals so as to reduce the 
likelihood of recidivism. The public health-quarantine model attempts to do both, retributivism 
by its very nature does neither. Since retributivism myopically focuses on justifying backward-
looking blame and punishment, it does not have the resources needed to address rehabilitation or 
preventative measures. I question, then, the claim that retributivism reflects a deeper concern for 
victims and their families. If one really cares about victims and their suffering, the best way to 
honor this concern is to reject retributivism and adopt a more holistic approach to criminal 
behavior that focuses on preventing crime, rehabilitating criminals, and reducing the number of 
people who become victims of violent crime.  
 
Second, even if victims of violent crime wanted to see criminals suffer and were on the whole 
indifferent to concerns about safety and rehabilitation—contrary to what appears to be the case—
it does not follow that we should inflict such harm and suffering nor does it follow that denying 
victims the satisfaction of seeing their perpetrators suffer would be a violation of their rights. As 
Walen accurately points out, “the view that it wrongs victims not to punish wrongdoers confuses 
vengeance, which is victim-centered, with retributivism, which is agent-centered: concerned with 
giving the wrongdoer the punishment he deserves” (2014). Paul Robinson (2008), for instance, 
has argued that retributivists must distinguish between vengeful and deontological conceptions 
of deserved punishment. The former urges punishing an offender in a way that mirrors the harm 
or suffering he/she has caused: 
 
Because of this focus on the harm done, the vengeful conception of desert is commonly 
associated with the victim’s perspective. Retributive justice “consists in seeking equality 
between offender and victim by subjecting the offender to punishment and 
communicating to the victim a concern for his or her antecedent suffering” [(Fletcher 
1999: 58).]…And the association with the victim’s suffering, in turn, associates vengeful 
desert with the feelings of revenge and hatred that we commonly see in victims. Thus, 
punishment under this conception of desert is sometimes seen as essentially an 
institutionalization of victim revenge; it is “injury inflicted on a wrongdoer that satisfies 
the retributive hatred felt by the wrongdoer’s victim and that is justified because of that 
satisfaction” [(Feinberg and Coleman 2000: 793)]. (Robinson 2008: 147-48) 
 
The problem, however, is that justifying punishment on the grounds of vengefulness or the 
satisfaction of retributive hatred fails to take into account the blameworthiness of the offender. 
The deontological conception of desert, on the other hand, focuses at least not on the harm of the 
offense but on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the arguments and analysis of 
moral philosophy (Robinson 2008: 148).   
 
Thus, the criterion for assessing punishment is broader and richer than that for vengeful 
desert: Anything that affects an offender’s moral blameworthiness is taken into account 
in judging the punishment he deserves. The extent of the harm caused or the seriousness 
of the evil done will be part of that calculation but so too will be a wide variety of other 
factors, such as the offender’s culpable state of mind or lack thereof and the existing 
conditions at the time of offence, including those that might give rise to claims of 
justification, excuse, or mitigation. (Robinson 2008: 148) 
 
To the extent, then, that retributivists want to appeal to moral blameworthiness rather than 
vengeful desires in justifying punishment, denying victims the vengeful satisfaction they seek 
would not be a violation of their rights.  
  
This brings me to my next reply. Punishment inflicts harm on individuals and the justification for 
such harm must meet a high epistemic standard. If it is significantly probable that one’s 
justification for harming another is unsound, then, prima facie, that behavior is seriously wrong 
(Pereboom 2017a). But if free will skeptics are right, neither libertarians nor compatibilists 
satisfy this epistemic standard and hence individuals do not justly deserve to be punished. And if 
individuals do not justly deserve to be punished, there is no violation of the rights of victims to 
deny them the revenge they seek. Even retributivists would acknowledge that the desire for 
revenge and retribution has its limits. The principle of proportionality, despite its weaknesses, 
dictates that punishments that are disproportionate to the wrong done (whatever that ultimately 
amounts to) would be unjustified. Hence, if the victim of an armed robbery wanted to see their 
perpetrator executed, and this was deemed disproportionate punishment by the standards of 
retributivism, it would not be a violation of the victim’s rights on that theory to prohibit said 
execution. By extension, if free will skeptics are right, and retributive punishment itself is 
unjustified, then to deny victims their desire for revenge (conceived here in a purely backward-
looking, non-consequentialist sense) would likewise not be a violation of their rights. For victims 
to have the right to see suffering and harm imposed on their perpetrators, it would have to be the 
case that such harm was justified. According to free will skeptics, however, neither victims of 
violent crime nor the state acting on their behalf are justified in causing more harm than is 
minimally required for adequate protection.  
 
Lastly, the public health-quarantine model is able, I contend, to deal with the concerns of 
victims, acknowledge the wrongs done them, and help aid in recovery. First, recall that the 
Alliance for Safety and Justice Survey (2016) found that six in ten victims preferred that 
prosecutors consider victims’ opinion on what would help them recover from the crime, even 
when victims do not want long prison sentences. Too often tough on crime advocates and 
overzealous prosecutors speak for victims without listening to what they really want or 
considering what would help them recover. As the survey indicates, many victims prefer that the 
criminal justice system focus more on preventing crime by investing in job creation, education, 
and mental health services, as well as rehabilitating criminals rather than punishing them. Since 
the public health approach to criminal behavior similarly advocates for these reforms, it has the 
virtue of being sensitive to the concerns of victims. Many victims of violent crime want above all 
else to know that meaningful efforts are being made to guarantee that others do not suffer in the 
same way they have. Retributive punishment is unable to provide this, and in many cases simply 
obfuscates the need to do so. The public health-quarantine model, on the other hand, is perfectly 
designed to address the forward-looking concerns of victims and it is able to do so a manner that 
is acutely sensitive to the harms done them.      
 
Contrary to what some critics have argued, free will skepticism is consistent with acknowledging 
the moral wrongs done to victims. As Pereboom and I have argued: 
 
Accepting free will skepticism requires rejecting our ordinary view of ourselves as 
blameworthy or praiseworthy in the basic desert sense. A critic might first object that if 
we gave up this belief, we could no longer count actions as morally bad or good. In 
response, even if we came to hold that a serial killer was not blameworthy due to a 
degenerative brain disease, we could still justifiably agree that his actions are morally 
bad. Still, secondly, the critic might ask, if determinism precluded basic desert 
blameworthiness, would it not also undercut judgments of moral obligation? If “ought” 
implies “can,” and if because determinism is true an agent could not have avoided acting 
badly, it would be false that she ought to have acted otherwise. Furthermore, if an action 
is wrong for an agent just in case she is morally obligated not to perform it, determinism 
would also undermine judgements of moral wrongness (Haji 1998). In response, we 
contend that even if the skeptic were to accept all of this (and she might resist at various 
points; cf. Pereboom 2014: ch.6; Waller 2011), axiological judgments of moral goodness 
and badness would not be affected (Haji 1998; Pereboom 2001). So, in general, free will 
skepticism can accommodate judgments of moral goodness and badness, which are 
arguably sufficient for moral practice. (Pereboom and Caruso 2018: 200) 
 
There is nothing preventing free will skeptics, then, from acknowledging the moral wrongness of 
criminal acts. There is also nothing preventing them from acknowledging the harm done to 
victims by these morally bad acts. Given that free will skeptics can retain axiological judgments 
of moral goodness and badness, the public health-quarantine model can recommend that one way 
to help aid victims in recovery is to have the wrong done them acknowledged and a commitment 
made to rehabilitate the offender and protect others from similar crimes.    
 
This brings me to my final point. On the forward-looking account of moral responsibility 
developed by Pereboom (2013, 2014), non-desert-based blame and the acknowledgement of 
wrong can be used for the purposes of protection, moral formation, and reconciliation. This 
forward-looking approach to moral responsibility can be used to aid victims in their recovery and 
perhaps even achieve some form of reconciliation. Restorative justice models, for example, have 
been employed around the country over the last few decades with great success (see, e.g., Camp 
et al. 2013; Walgrave 2002). Restorative justice is an approach that emphasizes repairing the 
harm caused by criminal behavior by bringing together members of the community, victims, and 
offenders. As the Centre for Justice and Reconciliation describe it: 
 
Restorative justice views crime as more than breaking the law—it also causes harm to 
people, relationships, and the community. So a just response must address those harms as 
well as the wrongdoing. If the parties are willing, the best way to do this is to help them 
meet to discuss those harms and how to bring about resolution. Other approaches are 
available if they are unable or unwilling to meet. Sometimes those meetings lead to 
transformational changes in their lives.7 
 
The restorative approach maintains that the best way to repair the harms caused by criminal 
behavior is to bring together all stakeholders for the purpose of making amends and 
reintegration. It focuses on repairing the harm caused by crime and reducing future harm through 
crime prevention.  
 
Now it is true that most restorative justice methods require offenders to take responsibility for 
their actions and for the harm they have caused, but such responsibility need not be conceived in 
terms of basic desert. Most current restorative justice models probably do assume backward-
looking blame and basic desert moral responsibility (e.g., Sommers 2016), but these are not 
essential components of the restorative approach. The same ends, I contend, can be achieved on a 
model that does not appeal to basic desert moral responsibility. A conversational model of 
forward-looking moral responsibility like that proposed by Pereboom (2013, 2014) could, for 
example, serve as a basis for an exchange between victim and offender in a way that does not 
invoke backward-looking blame or basic desert. Such an exchange could aid both in the 
rehabilitation of offenders and in the recovery of victims. To use slightly different lingo, we can 
say that a restorative justice model consistent with free will skepticism could appeal to 
answerability and attributability conceptions of moral responsibility rather than accountability. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have argued that the public health-quarantine model not only justifies the 
incapacitation of dangerous criminals, it also demands that we identify and take action on the 
social determinants of criminal behavior—such as poverty, socioeconomic status, abuse and 
violence in the home, housing, mental health, access to healthcare, education, environmental 
health, and nutrition. I argued that the right to self-protection and prevention of harm to others 
justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate 
protection. But I also argued that a more comprehensive approach to criminal justice, one which 
views public safety as akin to public health, demands that we reject retributivism and purely 
punitive approaches to criminal justice and shift the focus to prevention, rehabilitation, and 
reintegration. The public health-quarantine model prioritizes prevention and social justice and 
maintains that the goal of the criminal justice system should be the rehabilitation and 
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what-is-restorative-justice/ 
reintegration of offenders back into society. Along the way, I also responded to several concerns 
about proportionality, human dignity, victims’ rights, and the incapacitation of innocent people. I 
argued that each of these concerns can be met and that the public health-quarantine model is 
consistent with free will skepticism, morally justifiable, and sufficient for good social policy. If 
what I’ve argued is correct, the public health-quarantine model offers free will skeptics a way 
forward and a suitable conception of justice without retribution.   
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